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In almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck. 
An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets 
happen to win. The same goes in the case of purely cognitive or intellectual endeavours. As 
inquirers, we characteristically aim to believe truly rather than falsely, and to attain such standings as 
knowledge and understanding. Sometimes such aims are attained with commendable competence, 
but of course, not always. ​Epistemic luck​  is a species of luck which features in circumstances where 
a given cognitive success—in the broadest sense, some form of cognitive contact with reality—is 
attained in a manner that is (in some to-be-specified sense) interestingly lucky—viz., chancy, 
accidental or beyond our control. In the paradigmatic case, this involves the formation of a belief 
that is luckily true, and where the subject plausibly deserves little credit for having gotten things 
right. Although the literature on epistemic luck has focused predominantly on the relationship 
between luck and propositional knowledge—which is widely taken to (in some sense) ​exclude 
luck—epistemologists are increasingly exploring the compatibility of epistemic luck with other kinds 
of epistemic standings, such as knowledge-how and understanding. 
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1. Epistemic luck and propositional knowledge 
The following is near-platitudinous in epistemology (see Epistemology):  
Anti-luck platitude​: For all ​S,​  ​p​ , if ​S​  ​knows ​ a proposition, ​p​ , then ​S​ ’s belief that ​p​  is (in 
some to-be-specified sense) not ‘true by luck’.  
As Jonathan (Dancy 1985, 134) puts it, the platitude that knowledge excludes luck ‘[…]was just the 
point of the Gettier counterexamples; nothing in the tripartite definition excluded knowledge by 
luck’ (see also Zagzebski 1996, 283; Pritchard 2017a, §2) (see Gettier problems; Knowledge, concept 
of). Moreover, it is common practice to dismiss an analysis of knowledge as materially inadequate if 
the analysis is clearly incompatible with this platitude (e.g., Chisholm 1989, 93) (see Chisholm, 
Roderick Milton (1916-1999)). For example, it is often with reference to the anti-luck platitude that 
epistemologists explain why Alvin Goldman’s (1967) early causal theory of knowing is unsatisfactory 
(e.g., Ichikawa and Steup 2014, §4) (see Knowledge, causal theory of). 
If it can be determined in what precise sense knowledge excludes luck—and correspondingly in 
what sense or senses knowledge ​tolerates​  luck, as it surely does in some fashion—then we will have 
gained an important insight into the nature of knowledge, conceived of as a standing that is 
essentially luck-resistant in some specific way (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007). Moreover, clarity on the 
matter of just how knowledge excludes luck could also provide useful insights into what makes 
knowledge valuable in a way that mere (unknown) true belief is not (e.g., Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 
2009; Haddock, Millar, ​&​  Pritchard 2010) (see Belief and knowledge; Epistemic value).  
However, the utility that the notion of epistemic luck stands to have in the theory of knowledge 
depends importantly on how satisfactorily (at least) three distinct (though interconnected) issues can 
be addressed. These issues have to do with (i) the philosophy of luck, more generally, of which 
epistemic luck is a species; (ii) the distinction between malignant and benign epistemic luck, ​vis-à-vis 
propositional knowledge; (iii) recent a priori and experimental challenges to received epistemological 
thinking about the relationship between knowledge and luck. 
2. Theories of luck: probabilistic, lack of control, and modal 
Given that luck is a variety of the more general phenomenon of luck, it is natural to suppose that a 
viable theory of epistemic luck will be premised upon a more general account of luck. But it is highly 
contentious amongst philosophers—in epistemology, and elsewhere—what counts as ​luck​ , in the 
more general sense (e.g., Lackey 2008; Hales 2014) and how it relates to similar phenomena such as 
chance and fortune (e.g., Pritchard 2005; Pritchard and Whittington 2015; Broncano-Berrocal 2016).  
To start with, a natural way to think of luck (shared in science and mathematics) takes into account 
the characteristic probabilistic profile of lucky events. In this sense, the ​probabilistic account of luck 
has it that an event is lucky if it was objectively unlikely prior to its occurrence (Baumann 2014). But 
although paradigmatic instances of luck (such as winning a fair lottery) fulfil this probabilistic profile, 
not all lucky events are unlikely prior to occurrence. If holding a winning ticket is the only way in 
which lottery participants can escape a painful death, holding a loser ticket represents a stroke of bad 
luck for anyone taking part in such a deathly game. But the probabilistic account delivers the wrong 
verdict. After all, the probability of losing and consequently dying is high, given the odds. This 
indicates that, while ​most ​ lucky events are (prior to occurrence) unlikely, there might also be highly 
probable lucky events. 
A related probabilistic view has it that lucky events are subjectively unlikely, i.e., events whose 
occurrence is unlikely from the agent’s perspective (Latus 2003). At first blush, the view might enjoy 
some plausibility, since luck is an agent-relative concept. On reflection, however, modelling luck as a 
perspectival notion (in terms of subjective probability) fails to capture our salient intuitions about 
how the concept should be applied. For instance, the view entails that firm believers in fate are 
never lucky, because anything that happens to them is (from their perspective) irremediably bound 
to happen. But if they won a fair lottery, it would be hard to deny that they are ​actually​  lucky, which 
is compatible with saying that they are ​apparently ​ lucky (see Rescher 2014 for the distinction 
between apparent and actual luck). 
According to a more popular account of luck​—the lack of control account ​ (e.g., Zimmerman 1987; 
Coffman 2009; Riggs 2009; Broncano-Berrocal 2015)​—​ an event is lucky for a given agent just when 
(in short) it is significantly enough beyond that agent’s control. The appeal of the view not only 
stems from the fact that it successfully accounts for paradigmatic cases of luck (e.g., lottery 
outcomes are typically beyond our control), but also from its liberal stance concerning the likelihood 
that lucky events should have: since the view is silent on the probabilistic profile of lucky events, it is 
compatible with attributing luck to events whose occurrence was (objectively or subjectively) likely 
or unlikely. 
Nonetheless, it has been objected that lack of control over an event does not suffice for the event to 
be lucky (Lackey 2008). Many nomic necessities (e.g., sunrises) are certainly beyond our control, but 
that of course does not make them instances of luck. In reply, lack of control theorists try to 
distinguish further senses of the notion of control to argue that, despite appearances, sunrises and 
other relevant nomic necessities can be, to some extent, under our control. Following this strategy, 
Wayne Riggs (2009) and Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (2015) grant that we certainly do not exert 
any causal influence over sunrises and akin events (i.e., we do not have causal control over them) but 
argue that luck-excluding forms of control also include our ability to exploit such events in favour of 
our interests or our natural disposition to monitor them and to competently rely on their occurrence 
for achieving basic aims (such as waking up). 
Finally, a view that also enjoys great popularity is the modal account of luck, whose core thesis is 
that lucky events are events that could easily have not occurred, where the notion of easy possibility 
of non-occurrence is typically cashed out in terms of closeness to the actual world (Pritchard 2005; 
2015). In this sense, the modal account holds that (actual) lottery winners are lucky because they 
would lose in close possible worlds, or less technically, in situations that are similar to the actual or 
real one (see Possible worlds).  
Despite its popularity, the modal view has been contested too. One flaw is that it does not seem to 
account for lucky events that arise out from coincidences whose components are sufficiently 
modally robust. To exemplify, if someone firmly decides to place a treasure at location ​L​ , places it 
(and would not have placed it at any other location), while at a later time (and in a completely 
independent manner) someone else (with the same determination) decides to dig the ground of ​L​ , 
digs it, and discovers the treasure, the happy discovery would still occur in close possible worlds 
(Lackey 2008). After all, the two persons were fully determined to carry out their respective actions. 
But while the discovery is clearly lucky (insofar as it arises out of a fortuitous coincidence), the 
modal account predicts, wrongly, that it is not. 
In reply, J. Adam Carter and Martin Peterson (2016) argue that examples of this sort do not speak 
against every modal account, but only against closeness accounts. Like Pritchard, they think that luck 
is modal in nature, but unlike him, they do not believe that luck is solely sensitive to what could 
easily​  have not occurred, but also (although not with the same weight) to how things stand in remote 
(i.e., non-close) possible worlds. They tweak the modal account accordingly so as to ultimately argue 
that the intuitive verdict that the discovery of the treasure is a stroke of luck (at least partially) 
derives from the fact that such an event would fail to occur in distant possible worlds. For a related 
reply to such cases, see also Pritchard (2014). 
  
 
 
 
Although the growing literature on luck has not reached an agreement on the nature of luck yet, 
most luck-theorists are confident that the ongoing conceptual work will help illuminate the nature of 
epistemic luck as well (but see Ballantyne 2014 for a divergent opinion in this regard). In fact, as we 
will see next, epistemic luck is just mundane luck affecting factors that are necessary for knowledge. 
3. Malignant and benign epistemic luck 
Even if the more general phenomenon of luck were clearly in view, it remains that ​some ​ kinds of 
luck seem perfectly compatible with knowledge, as there are multiple senses in which it might be 
down to luck that the beliefs we have are true, even when these beliefs are known. Distinguishing 
knowledge-undermining from innocuous epistemic luck is accordingly a central project in the 
contemporary epistemic luck literature, a project that has been mainly carried out by Duncan 
Pritchard (2005) drawing on work by Peter Unger (1968). 
Pritchard’s methodological approach to taxonomizing varieties of epistemic luck consists in 
distinguishing several factors that are uncontroversially taken to be necessary for knowledge and in 
seeing what happens to our epistemological intuitions when they obtain by luck. In this way, the 
distinguished varieties of epistemic luck are classified as ‘malignant’ or ‘benign’ depending on 
whether or not they have the capacity to undermine knowledge.  
Let’s consider some examples of benign epistemic luck. Firstly, it is a platitude that in order to know 
agents need not only to exist, but also to possess the relevant physical and psychological 
constitution. In this way, it might be a matter of luck that someone ends up being so constituted, but 
such ​capacity luck ​ is not necessarily incompatible with knowledge, at least if that person exercises 
the relevant luckily acquired cognitive faculties competently. Analogously, it might be entirely down 
to luck that there is a truth-maker for the believed proposition, but such ​content luck​  does not 
undermine knowledge either. If, after a fair qualifying round draw, it is by luck that your favourite 
team will start playing away, the luck in play does not obviously prevent you from coming to know 
the true proposition that your team will start playing away.  
Finally, it is entirely possible that, due to sheer luck, someone ends up having access to a certain 
batch of evidence (see Evidence). For example, Sherlock Holmes may have got his (conclusive) 
evidence that the butler is the murderer by accidental eavesdropping. ​Evidential luck​ , however, is 
not knowledge-undermining, because the luckiness of the evidence does not necessarily transmit to 
knowledge. Sherlock’s evidence, in a way, puts him in a position to know, but just as being by luck in 
a position to play basketball does not make Michael Jordan’s shots lucky, being by luck in a position 
to know does not make Sherlock’s knowledge lucky. After all, Sherlock’s reasoning capacities remain 
extremely reliable no matter how fortunate he is to be in a position to exercise them. 
By contrast, if after acquiring his evidence (luckily or not), Sherlock gets things right by luck, he fails 
to know regardless of the truth value of his beliefs. Suppose that (luckily or not) he overhears a 
conversation in which the butler tells to a (supposed) accomplice ‘Do not worry, I killed him’ and 
that, on that basis, he comes to believe that the butler is the murderer, which is true, as a matter of 
fact. However, also suppose that (here comes the Gettier-style twist) with the pronoun ‘him’ the 
butler was not referring to the (human) victim, but to his own dog, who got rabies. In this way, 
Sherlock comes to form a true belief, but by sheer luck. This sort of ​veritic luck ​ is called ​intervening 
 epistemic luck​  (because it is as if luck intervened in the way the agent’s belief hits, so to speak, the 
truth), and it’s the kind of luck involved in standard Gettier-style cases like the previous example. 
Non-standard Gettier-style cases, however, involve a different sort of veritic luck called 
environmental epistemic luck​ .​ ​ In the famous barn façade case (Goldman 1976), a driver, Henry, 
forms the lucky true belief that there is a barn right in front of him by directly looking at the only 
real building in an area full of indistinguishable barn façades that he could easily have erroneously 
believed to be real barns. Unlike in standard Gettier-style cases, in these sorts of cases luck does not 
directly intervene in the way the subject forms his belief. Instead, the environment is such that 
possibilities of error could easily have become actual. In this way, since it is a matter of chance that 
such a thing does not end up being the case, the resulting true beliefs are formed in an 
environmentally lucky fashion (but see McKinnon 2014 for criticism on the distinction between 
intervening and environmental luck). 
Epistemic luck might also operate at the reflective level. Consider professional chicken-sexers, who 
are very reliable in distinguishing male from female chicks. It might be the case that some of them 
turn out to be mistaken about their reliable cognitive performances, for instance, by holding false 
beliefs about the nature of their belief-forming methods (e.g., they might think that they are tracking 
olfactory instead of visual or tactile cues) or by being unconfident about their own reliability (see 
Reliabilism). Pritchard (2005) argues that subjects in such an epistemic position are reflectively lucky, 
not because they would get things wrong in standardly ordered close possible worlds (as it happens 
with veritic luck), but because they would get things wrong in the closest possible worlds that are 
consistent with what those subjects can know by reflection alone in the actual world​ . Nonetheless, it 
is an open question whether or not this special kind of epistemic luck, ​reflective luck​ , undermines 
knowledge. Most externalists would surely endorse the negative claim (see Internalism and 
externalism in epistemology). After all, they reject that we need reflectively accessible grounds to 
know and, in this sense, they would be happy to claim that a belief can be both reflectively lucky and 
knowledge.  
4.Challenges to the anti-luck platitude: a priori and experimental 
A third central project for anti-luck epistemologists is to address two very different forms of 
scepticism about the insight that knowledge excludes luck. One such strand of argument has been 
advanced on ​a priori​  philosophical grounds (e.g., Hetherington 1998; 2013; Baumann 2014) (see A 
priori). For example, according to Stephen Hetherington (1998, 456), the anti-luck platitude 
articulated in §1 rests upon what he terms the ‘Epistemic Counterfactuals Fallacy’, according to 
which actual lack of knowledge is inferred from counterfactual lack of knowledge. Such a fallacy is 
committed, Hetherington claims, by epistemologists who fail to attribute knowledge in certain cases 
simply because the agent in question could easily have not known. As Hetherington puts it, when 
diagnosing the classic barn façade case, ‘Epistemologists infer from the fact that Henry would be 
deceived if he were to continue his drive that he does lack knowledge’ (Hetherington 1998, 456). 
Such an inference, he claims, confuses ​genuinely​  lacking knowledge with ​almost ​ lacking it.  
In response to this argument, Brent Madison (2011) has suggested that proponents of the anti-luck 
platitude should grant Hetherington’s claim that it is fallacious to infer from the fact that one could 
easily have not known that ​p​ , that one thereby does not know that ​p​ . However, Madison argues that 
this concession is ultimately not problematic for proponents of the anti-luck platitude because, 
contra​  Hetherington, proponents of the anti-luck platitude are not relying on this fallacious 
inference, even if they might appear to do so.  
To appreciate Madison’s rejoinder here, it will be helpful to recall again the distinction between 
evidential​  and ​veritic​  luck noted in §3. In cases of evidential luck, where one is lucky to possess the 
evidence one has, it is true that one could easily have failed to possess knowledge. However, the 
proponent of the anti-luck platitude is not committed to concluding in such a scenario where 
evidence is luckily acquired that one actually does lack knowledge. And this is for the reason, already 
outlined in §3, that what is crucial to the anti-luck platitude is not that one’s knowing a proposition 
precludes one from being such that one could easily have not known that proposition; rather, the 
crucial commitment is the more refined claim that propositional knowledge precludes being such 
that, given how one has formed one’s belief, one could easily have believed falsely. Thus, if the 
slogan that knowledge precludes luck—as it is traditionally defended—is false on ​a priori​  grounds, it 
need not be because the slogan relies on the fallacious reasoning captured by the Epistemic 
Counterfactuals Fallacy. For some additional arguments by Hetherington against the anti-luck 
platitude, see Hetherington (2013). 
Another very different source of scepticism about the anti-luck platitude comes from the camp of 
experimental philosophy (see Experimental philosophy). In a recent study by John Turri (2016b), 
over 80% of participants surveyed attributed knowledge in a barn façade style case, despite the 
presence of environmental (veritic) epistemic luck. Similar results have been reported in other 
experimental studies (e.g., Colaco, Buckwalter, Stich ​&​  Machery 2014; Turri, Buckwalter ​&​  Blouw 
2014). What to conclude from these results remains controversial. To the extent that folk judgments 
about knowledge, as reported in such experiments, should inform epistemological theories of 
knowledge, proponents of the anti-luck platitude incur at least some explanatory burden in light of 
these results. One strategy of response, championed by Timothy Williamson (2007), is to simply 
discount the evidential weight of folk judgments about philosophical thought experiments on the 
grounds that philosophical training is relevant to picking up on the relevant nuances of such cases. 
This expertise reply to the experimental data could be countered by critics of the anti-luck platitude 
on experimental grounds if experimental studies could also demonstrate that those with 
philosophical training are inclined to attribute knowledge in barn façade cases. On this point, 
however, what to make of the evidence is debatable. Recent results reported by Hovarth ​& 
Weigmann (2017, 11) and Carter, Pritchard and Shepherd (2016) indicate that while participants with 
self-reported philosophical expertise do in fact attribute propositional knowledge to some extent in 
barn façade style cases, they do so to a​ lesser​  extent than those without self-reported expertise. What 
to infer from this comparative data is open to philosophical interpretation. 
5. Epistemic luck and knowledge-how 
Recently, the question of whether knowledge-how is compatible with the kinds of epistemic luck 
that knowledge-that is generally regarded to exclude has been a point of contention between 
intellectualists​  and ​anti-intellectualists​  about knowledge-how (see Knowing how to). Intellectualists 
claim that knowledge-how is just a kind of propositional knowledge, viz., knowledge-that (i.e., 
Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011). If this is right, then knowledge-how should be 
compatible/incompatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as the items of propositional 
knowledge the anti-intellectualist identifies with knowledge-how, a point that intellectualists such as 
Stanley have explicitly granted (e.g., 2011, 215). However, Poston (2009), Cath (2011) and Carter and 
Pritchard (2015) have on the basis of different kinds of counterexamples, argued that this luck-based 
intellectualist prediction is not borne out, and that therefore, ​contra​  intellectualism, knowledge-how 
is not a kind of propositional knowledge.  
Poston and Cath have in common that they think intervening veritic luck (of the sort canvassed in 
§3), which is granted to be incompatible with knowledge-that, is nonetheless compatible with 
knowledge-how. An example Cath relies on to make this point involves an individual, ‘Charlie’, who 
wishes to learn how to change a lightbulb and accordingly consults the ‘Idiot’s Guide to Home 
Repair’. Unbeknownst to Charlie, the guide was written by pranksters who filled the book with 
misleading and inaccurate instructions. However—and here is the twist in the tail—the text at the 
printer’s was rearranged so that the entry under ‘Lightbulbs’ just so happened to include correct 
instructions, which Charlie relies on to successfully change the bulb. Cath’s claim is that, firstly, 
Charlie intuitively knows how to change a light-bulb after reading these correct instructions. If this 
intuition is granted, then if intellectualism is correct, then Charlie must also know, of some way ​w​ , 
that ​w​  is the way for Charlie to change a lightbulb. However, as Cath points out, Charlie lacks such 
knowledge, given the presence of intervening luck. Thus, as this line of argument goes, 
intellectualism should be rejected. 
Stanley (2011, 179) has since replied to such cases, on behalf of intellectualism, by claiming that 
Cath’s argument overgeneralises so as to apply problematically to cases of knowledge-wh (e.g., 
knowledge-where, knowledge-when, knowledge-why, etc.). Regardless of whether Stanley’s 
overgeneralisation strategy is viable (cf., Carter and Pritchard 2015, 448-9)—a point we lack the 
space to cover here—there remains a further way to challenge intellectualism on luck-based grounds 
which does not rely on the claim that intervening luck is compatible with knowledge-how.  
According to this other strand of argument, defended by Carter and Pritchard (2015), 
knowledge-how is, contrary to what Cath and Poston have argued, incompatible with intervening 
epistemic luck of the sort that features in standard Gettier cases. However, they argue, 
environmental ​ epistemic luck behaves differently with respect to knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that. The case they offer to make this argument is a variation on Cath’s light-bulb case. 
Carter and Pritchard tweak the details so that we are to suppose that Charlie (unlike in Cath’s 
original case) consults a genuine, authoritative guide to home improvement, instead of a guide made 
by pranksters but which only happened to be correct. The twist in the tail is that the genuine guide 
to home improvement happens to be on a library shelf, surrounded by fake guides which include 
inaccurate instructions for changing a lightbulb. In such a circumstance, Carter and Pritchard argue, 
Charlie by consulting the genuine guide knows how to change a lightbulb, despite (given the 
presence of environmental luck) there not being any way ​w​  such that Charlie knows ​that​  ​w​  is the 
way to change a lightbulb. Thus, the conclusion drawn is that knowledge-how is compatible with a 
kind of luck—viz., environmental epistemic luck—incompatible with knowledge-that, and so the 
former cannot as the intellectualist claims be a kind of the latter.  
However, the intellectualist might have a final card yet to play in response to such cases. In more 
recent work, Cath (2015) has changed his thinking; his current line is that the intellectualist can deny 
that the kinds of cases considered in this section are counterexamples by rejecting the ‘orthodox 
assumption that knowledge-that is ​always​  incompatible with Gettier-style luck’. It is open to the 
intellectualist, Cath claims, to maintain that while most kinds of propositional knowledge are 
incompatible with veritic epistemic luck, the propositional knowledge which the intellectualist 
identifies with knowledge-how is a special case of knowledge-that which is not. Such a retreat on 
behalf of the intellectualist, however, involves revisionary thinking about not just the anti-luck 
platitude, but also the nature of propositional knowledge. 
6. Epistemic luck and understanding 
Just as intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that knowledge-how is a kind of propositional 
knowledge, some epistemologists (e.g., Grimm 2006; Depaul and Grimm 2007; Sliwa 2015) working 
on understanding have defended a similar kind of reductionism according to which, as Paulina Sliwa 
(2015, 57) puts it, ‘instances of understanding reduce to instances of knowing’ (see Understanding). 
If this is correct, then to the extent that epistemic luck is incompatible with (propositional) 
knowledge, it should also be incompatible with understanding.  
However, at this point, we find arguments which broadly parallel arguments surveyed against 
intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how as canvassed in §2. According to partial compatibilists, 
such as Pritchard (2008), understanding is compatible with environmental epistemic luck but 
incompatible with intervening epistemic luck.  
Full compatibilists, such as Zagzebski (2001) and Kvanvig (2003) and, more recently, Riaz (2015), 
Rohwer (2014) and Morris (2012), take understanding to be compatible not only with environmental 
but also with intervening epistemic luck of the sort at play in standard Gettier cases. One 
much-discussed example case aimed at establishing this point is Jonathan Kvanvig’s (2003, 197) 
‘Comanche case’, in which Kvanvig invites us to imagine that one reads a book on the Comanche 
tribe, thereby acquiring a belief set about the Comanche’s dominance of the Southern plains of 
North America between the 17th and 19th centuries. Kvanvig insists that understanding this subject 
matter, viz., the Comanche’s dominance of the Southern plains, is retained (provided other 
conditions are met) even if it turns out that all the information in the book was Gettiered. If 
understanding is compatible with intervening luck in this way, and indeed if understanding is 
compatible with environmental epistemic luck (viz., as would be the case if a genuine book on the 
Comanche was consulted, but which happened to be surrounded by fakes) as Pritchard (2008) 
maintains, then there is reason to doubt that understanding is a kind of propositional knowledge.  
One potential ambiguity in the literature on understanding and its relationship to epistemic luck 
concerns the distinction between ​objectual understanding​ , as one attains when one understands a 
subject matter or body of information, and ​understanding-why​ , as when one understands an 
explanation. These two kinds of understanding are often run together in the contemporary debate 
about the compatibility of understanding with epistemic luck. While objectual understanding and 
understanding-why might behave exactly the same ​vis-à-vis​  epistemic luck, it is a theoretical 
possibility that they do not. For further discussion on the differences between these two species of 
understanding and how they interface with epistemic luck, see Gordon (2016). 
7. Epistemic luck and epistemic risk 
Pritchard (2017) and Broncano-Berrocal (2015) argue that the concepts of luck and risk are basically 
coextensive. The only differences are, firstly, that while luck can be positive or negative, risk has a 
negative connotation; secondly, we typically do not talk of low levels of luck, but we can talk of low 
levels of risk. Putting these two minor differences aside, they account for luck and risk in the same 
terms. More specifically, and in keeping with the lack of control account of luck, Broncano-Berrocal 
(2015) argues that an ​agent​  is at risk with respect to (the possible of occurrence of) an event just in 
case it is beyond their control. By contrast, in keeping with the modal view of luck, Pritchard 
(2017b) thinks that an ​event​  is at risk of occurring just in case it would occur in at least some close 
possible worlds. Far from being incompatible, Broncano-Berrocal’s lack of control account and 
Pritchard’s modal view capture two complementary aspects of the notion of risk: the risk that an 
event has of occurring—or ​event-relative risk​ —and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an 
event—or ​agent-relative risk​ .  
If there exists a close relationship between luck and risk, it is natural to think that there also exists a 
close relationship between epistemic luck and epistemic risk. In this sense, Pritchard (2017b) 
characterises beliefs that are true by luck (i.e., veritically lucky beliefs) as beliefs that are formed in an 
epistemically risky fashion. In other words, lucky true beliefs are beliefs that were at risk of being 
false, or in modal terms, beliefs that turn out false in close possible worlds in which the agent forms 
them in the same way as in the actual world.  
Pritchard argues that moving from an anti-luck epistemology (i.e., an epistemology that essentially 
aims at eliminating knowledge-undermining luck; see Modal epistemology) to an anti-risk 
epistemology (i.e., an epistemology that aims at eliminating epistemic risk) helps shed some light on 
environmental epistemic luck. In particular, there is an increasing tendency to accept that 
propositional knowledge is compatible with environmental luck. After all, unlike beliefs that fall 
short of knowledge due to intervening luck, beliefs that are environmentally lucky are true because 
of an exercise of cognitive ability (in the barn façade case, Henry successfully exercises his visual 
abilities). But Pritchard contends that since intervening and environmental luck involve the same 
levels of (modally understood) epistemic risk, the claim that environmental luck is compatible with 
knowledge translates as the claim that knowledge tolerates high levels of epistemic risk, a thesis that 
many epistemologists would consider considerably more controversial than the former claim. 
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